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D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 86 (October 29, 2015)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CONSTRUCTION DEFECT CONTEXT

Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court considered a Petitioner home builder’s petition for
writ relief and appeal of a district court order granting Respondent HOA’s ex parte
motion for a stay and enlargement of time for service pursuant to NRS 40.647(2)(b).
Ruling on Petitioner’s two writ petitions, the Court held the district court’s grant of a stay
was not in error and the NRCP 41(e) five-year limitation period was tolled under the
Boren2 exception to NRCP 41(e). Accordingly, the Court denied both writ petitions.
Background
High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Association operates Arlington
Ranch community, which consists of 342 individual units contained in 114 buildings.
The sales documents for these units preclude express and implied warranty actions after
two years. On July 7, 2007, High Noon filed a complaint against homebuilder, D.R.
Horton, alleging breach of implied and express warranties, breach of contract, and breach
of fiduciary duties. While High Noon did not specifically allege its claims fell within
NRS 40’s construction defect provisions, High Noon moved for an ex parte stay and
enlargement of time for service pending completion of construction defect pre litigation
procedures pursuant to NRS 40.647(2)(b). Conversely, D.R. Horton moved for dismissal
pursuant to NRCP 41(e)’s five-year rule. The district court denied the motion to dismiss
and granted a stay, which commenced on April 13, 2007. Over eight years later, NRS
Chapter 40 process remains incomplete. D.R. Horton appeals and requests writ relief.
Discussion
Writ relief is appropriate
While writ relief is generally not available when “adequate and speedy legal
remedies exist,”3 the Nevada Supreme Court may exercise discretion to intervene to
clarify issues of law and promote judicial economy and administration.4 This case calls
the Court to address two important issues in Nevada construction defect law, namely,
whether NRS 40.647(2) allows a stay of proceedings for a party to comply with NRS
Chapter 40 construction defect prelitigation duties, and whether the stay tolls the running
of the five year period under NRCP 41(e). Accordingly, as a threshold issue, writ relief
is appropriate here.
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By Brandonn Grossman
Boren v. City of North Las Vegas, 98 Nev. 5, 638 P.2d 404 (1982).
3
Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008).
4
Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008) (quoting State v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 609, 614, 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002)).
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Granting stay pursuant to NRCP 40.647(2)
NRS 40.647(2)(b) specifically states that a plaintiff who files a constructional
defect suit before completing pre litigation process would be prevented from filing
another suit “because the action would be procedurally barred by the statute of limitations
or statute of repose, the court shall stay the proceeding pending compliance with [NRS
Chapter 40 requirements].”5
Because NRS Chapter 40 does not prevent any defense otherwise available6 and
D.R. Horton attempted to limit its warranties in their sales documents to a two-year
period pursuant to NRS 116.4116(1), D.R. Horton could argue a shorter limitations
period based on these sales contracts. Based on contractual modification of the NRS
Chapter 116 limitation period for warranties, the Court broadly interpreted NRS
40.647(2)(b) to allow the district court to enter stay, analogous to its authority in a statute
of limitations context, so High Noon could undertake NRS Chapter 40 pre litigation
process without jeopardizing its claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district
court’s grant of a stay and enlargement of time.
The August 2007 stay tolled the five-year rule under the Boren exception
While NRCP 41(e)’s five-year rule requires dismissal of an action where a case
has not been brought to trial after five years,7 the Nevada Supreme Court has recognized
exceptions to the mandatory nature of this required dismissal. The Boren exception reads
“any period during which the parties are prevented from bringing an action to trial by
reason of a stay order shall not be computed in determining the five-year period of
[NRCP] 41(e).”8 The Court determined the Boren rule applied here, where the matter
was stayed until completion of NRS 40.600 litigation process and the August 2007 stay
effectively tolls the NRCP 41(e) period while stay is in effect.
The future of Boren
The Court declined to interpret Boren and its progeny as requiring district courts
to evaluate the diligence of parties in determining if a valid court-ordered stay tolls the
NRCP 41(e) period. A proper stay, such as the one here, tolls this prescriptive period as
long as the stay remains in effect, notwithstanding diligence of the parties. The Court
importantly noted such stays prevent parties from prosecuting the case. Additionally, the
Court refused to adopt a new exemption to the Boren rule excluding constructional defect
stays from tolling. The Court determined stays by way of NRS 40.647(2)(b) in the
construction defect context are given the full period allowed by NRCP 41(e).
Accordingly, NRS Chapter 40 litigants are included in the Boren exception.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.647 (2)(b).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.635(3).
7
NEV. R. CIV. P. 41(e).
8 Boren,
638 P.2d at 405.
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Conclusion
The Court denied both writs, holding the August 2007 stay is valid, which tolled the fiveyear prescriptive period under NRCP 41(e), pursuant to Boren.

